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RACE DISCRIMINATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

CLASS ACTIONS:
THE VIRTUAL EXCLUSION OF RACIAL
MINORITIES FROM THE CLASS ACTION DEVICE
GeorgeA. Martinez*

I. INTRODUCTION

In the era of Jim Crow, racial minorities were segregated and excluded from
participating in white society. I Minorities were segregated in public schools, 2 excluded
from public accommodations, 3 excluded from participation on juries, 4 and excluded
from living in certain areas. 5 Harkening back to that earlier time, racial minorities now
are often excluded from using the class action device to bring civil rights claims.
This paper argues that courts are very tough in how they handle class certification
decisions in race discrimination class actions. On the other hand, the courts are quite
lenient in how they handle class certification decisions in human rights class actions.
The paper tries to explain why this is the case. The paper argues that race
discrimination class action cases should be treated in the same lenient fashion as the
human rights cases.
In Part II of this paper, I set out some history regarding class actions. Part III sets
out the basic requirements for certification of a class action. Part IV examines how the
courts have treated human rights class actions in making class certification decisions.

. Professor of Law, Dedman School of Law at Southern Methodist University; B.A., Arizona
State University;
M.A. (Philosophy), University of Michigan; J.D., Harvard University. I would like to thank Dean Kevin R.
Johnson and Professor Christopher Cameron for their comments on a draft of this article and for helpful
discussion of the topics in this article. Jeff Matovich and Jeff Todd provided helpful research assistance.
I. DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 110 (3d ed. 1992) ("[N]o detail was too
small in the frantic effort to seal off contact between blacks and whites .... The law had created two worlds,
so separate that communication between them was almost impossible."); DAVID MONTEJANO, ANGLOS AND
MEXICANS IN THE MAKING OF TEXAS, 1836-1986 160 (1987) ("The modern order framed Mexican-Anglo
relations in stark 'Jim Crow' segregation. Separate quarters for Mexican and Anglo were to be found in the
farm towns. Specific rules defined the proper place of Mexicans and regulated interracial contact").
2. MONTEJANO, supra note 1, at 160 ("The emergence of a Mexican school system suggests definite
patterns. The first 'Mexican School' was established in 1902 in Central Texas (in Seguin) and the practice
continued unabated until Mexican ward schools existed throughout the state."); see. e.g., Roberts v. City of
Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849) (approving segregation of African-Americans in public schools).
3. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding separate facilities for white and black
passengers on trains); Terrell Wells Swimming Pool v. Rodriguez, 182 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944)
(upholding the exclusion of Mexican-Americans from amusement enterprise swimming pools).
4. See, e.g., Hernandez v. State, 251 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. 1952) (stating that proportional representation of
Mexican-Americans is not required injuries as long as there is no express discrimination).
5. See, e.g., BELL, supra note I, at 691 (discussing "restrictive covenants aimed at preventing blacks
from purchasing property in white neighborhoods").
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Part V compares the human rights cases to the courts' handling of race discrimination
class actions and points out that the cases are treated differently. Part VI seeks to
explain the differential treatment. Part VII argues that the race cases should be treated
in the same lenient fashion as the human rights cases.
II. CLASS ACTIONS-HISTORY

In order to bring a lawsuit, someone must initiate the action. In order for an
individual to bring an action, the injury must be sufficient to justify the lawsuit.
Sometimes the injury is not enough to justify an individual action, even though the case
might present an important social concern. 6 The classic situation is where a large group
of individuals might have suffered small damages. The small damages suffered by an
individual might not be enough to justify bringing an individual action, but the fact that
a large number of persons might have been injured by illegal activity and the total
amount of damages might be significant raises an important social concern. What is to
be done in such a situation? Our legal system has dealt with this situation by
developing the class action procedural device. 7 The class action makes it possible to
bring a lawsuit to collect damages not simply for an individual, but damages for the
entire group of injured people. 8 From the perspective of an attorney, class
actions make
9
economic sense since the attorneys would be paid out of the recovery.
In a foundational article dealing with class actions, the authors saw the class action
device - since it sought redress for group wrongs - as a vehicle for the vindication of
"semi-public rights."10 Collective litigation, then, may serve even loftier goals than just
dispute resolution. In NAACP v. Button,1 1 the Supreme Court recognized that collective
litigation can be a form of political expression:
In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private
differences;... It is...
a form of political expression. Groups which find themselves
unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the courts....

For such a group, association for litigation may be the most effective form of political
association. 12

In 1966, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended in part to

6. Owen M. Fiss, The PoliticalTheory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 21, 22 (1996).
7. See Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) ("Where it is not economically
feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for
damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they may employ the class-action
device.")
8. JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANSGRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION: PROBLEMS IN ADVANCED CIVIL

PROCEDURE 103 (2002) ("The concept of a class action is simple: a single case is brought by (or against) one
or more persons that sue (or are sued) on their own behalf and also on behalf of others (the 'class' that are
similarly situated.")
9. RICHARD D. FREER, INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL PROCEDURE 698 (2006) ("Most plaintiff class actions
are taken on a contingent fee basis, which means the lawyer is paid a percentage of what the claim recovers.")
10. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The ContemporaryFunction of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L.
REV. 684, 717 (1941).
11. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
12. Id. at 429-31.
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3
facilitate the use of the class action device as a way to vindicate social rights.'
Explaining these changes, Abram Chayes' classic article on public law litigation
observed that the class action device "seemed perfectly adapted" to achieve the
objectives of "reformist litigators" in a range of cases, including civil rights actions.
In the wake of these amendments, many class actions were brought. Professor
Benjamin Kaplan gave an optimistic appraisal of these developments three years after
the changes took place:

There are some who are repelled by these massive, complex, unconventional lawsuits
because they call for so much judicial initiative and management. We hear talk that it
all belongs not to the courts but to administrative agencies. But by hypothesis, we are
dealing with cases that are not handled by existing agencies, and I do not myself see
any subversion of judicial process here but rather a fine opportunity for its
accommodation to new challenges of the times. The class action takes its place in a
larger search for pliant and sensitive procedures. I confess I am exhilarated, not
depressed by experimentation which spies out carefully the furthest possibilities of
the new Rule. 15

III.

CLASS ACTION REQUIREMENTS

In order to certify a class action, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) requires that
it satisfy the prerequisites of "numerosity," "commonality," "typicality," and "adequacy
of representation." 16
In addition, there must be an adequately defined class and the class representative
must be a member of the class. 17 If the requirements are met, the plaintiffs must then
establish that the cases can be subsumed under one of the types of classes permitted by
Rule 23(b). 18 In this respect, the most popular type of class actions is a Rule 23(b)(3)
class action which requires that common questions predominate over individual
questions. 19

13. See Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term - Foreword. Public Law Litigation and the
Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 27 (1982).
14. Id. at 27. Some of these changes were anticipated by Professor Fleming James when he observed:
If the spurious class suit judgment were given broader binding effect, however, the device would
obviously be a far more efficient one in minimizing litigation. It would, for example, be capable
of compelling the settlement in a single lawsuit of all the claims arising out of widespread injury
caused by a single untoward event.., and it would be a more effective device in dealing with race
relationsproblems.
FLEMING JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 500 (1965) (emphasis added), quoted in RICHARD L. MARCUS &
EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE

219 (4th ed. 2004).
15. Benjamin Kaplan, A PrefatoryNote, 10 B. C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 500 (1969).
16. FED R. Civ. P. 23(a).
17. JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANSGRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 555
(1998).
18. FED R. Civ. P. 23(b).
19. TIDMARSH & TRANSGRUD, supra note 8, at 137-38.

Journalof Legislation

IV.

[Vol. 33:2

HUMAN RIGHTS CLASS ACTIONS

is the use of the class
litigation
One of the most interesting developments• in
20
.
. recent
action device to seek redress for human rights violations. Human rights "are regarded
as those fundamental and inalienable rights which are essential for life as a human
being." 2 1 All people possess these rights by virtue of their being human and
governments must recognize and protect these rights. 22 Litigants began to bring these
23
The Act
actions by means of the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA" or the "Act").
by
action
civil
provides that "[tihe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
4
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations.
In Filartigav. Pena-Irala,25 a Paraguayan torture victim brought an action against
a Paraguayan police officer. The main question was whether torture constituted a "tort
in violation of the law of nations" as required by the ATCA. 26 The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that official torture is prohibited by the law of nations and is
sufficient to establish jurisdiction under the ATCA. 27 Since Filartiga, federal courts
have used the ATCA to assert jurisdiction over a wide range of human rights cases,
including war crimes and genocide. 28 In addition to the ATCA, the Torture Victim
Protection Act establishes a right to sue any individual who commits acts of torture or
extrajudicial killing. 29
The courts have not subjected human rights class actions to rigorous analysis in
Consider
deciding whether they meet the Rule 23 requirements for class certification.
31
some examples. In Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, Philippine nationals brought a class
years. 32
action against Ferdinand Marcos, who had ruled the Philippines for fourteen

20. For more on the rise of international human rights litigation, see Kevin R. Johnson, International
Human Rights Class Actions: New Frontiersfor Group Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 643; Walter W.
Heiser, Civil Litigation as a Means of Compensating Victims of InternationalTerrorism, 3 SAN DIEGO INT'L
L. J. 1 (2002); Susan L. Karamanian, New Challenges for the American Lawyer in International Human
Rights, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 757 (1998); Margaret G. Perl, Not Just Another Mass Tort: Using Class
Actions to Redress InternationalHuman Rights Violations, 88 GEO. L.J. 773 (2000).
21. REBECCA M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 175 (1986).
22. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2, sec. 1, adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 173 (entered into force on March 23,1976, and ratified by the
United States on June 8, 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR] ("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized
in the present Covenant .... "); Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, para. 1, July 12, 1993, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 ("Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings; their
protection and promotion is the first responsibility of Governments.")
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
25. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 884.
28. See Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of
Domestic Remedies for InternationalHuman Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L. L. 1, 6 (2002).
29. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)).
30. See Perl, supra note 20, at 779-84.
31. 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996).
32. For more on the Marcos litigation, see Joan Fitzpatrick, The Future of the Alien Tort Claims Act of
1789: Lessons from In re Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 491 (1993); Ellen L. Lutz,
The Marcos Human Rights Litigation: Can Justice Be Achieved in US. Courts for Abuses that Occurred
Abroad?, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 43 (1994); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of Filartiga:
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The district court certified a class of 10,000 people defined as "[a]ll current civilian
citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who between
1972 and 1986 were tortured, summarily executed or disappeared while in the custody
34
' 33
The Ninth Circuit upheld the class certification.
of military or paramilitary groups.
The Estate of Marcos argued that the claims of the named plaintiffs were not typical of
the claims of the class as required by Rule 23(a)(3) because there were "significant
individual questions in each case related to... whether any compensable injury
exist[ed]." 35 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument holding that the question of
whether any compensable injury existed for a particular class member was "virtually
identical in each case." 36 That question was, "[d]id the victim experience pain and
suffering from the torture, summary execution, or 'disappearance?' 37 The court of
appeals did not appear to subject this requirement to stringent analysis that is often
found in cases that discuss the typicality requirement. Courts often hold that the
typicality requirement is not satisfied where there are "factual differences from one
class member to another." 38 Here it seems easy to imagine that the individual
circumstances of the 10,000 members of the class might have varied significantly. For
example, what type of injury was inflicted and by whom? How much pain was
suffered? Another factor that suggests that the Ninth Circuit did not engage in a
rigorous scrutiny of the class certification requirements is the court's failure to criticize
the sufficiency of the district court's class certification analysis even though the district
court failed to include a certification analysis in its class certification order. 39 Also, the
court of appeals did not question the absence of specific findings regarding Rule
23(b)(3)'s requirements that common questions predominate over any questions
affecting class members n°individually and that a class action is superior to other methods
of adjudicating the case.
Another example is Jane Doe I v. Karadzic.4 1

In Karadzic, the district court

certified a class of thousands composed of:
all people who suffered injury as a result of rape, genocide, summary execution,
arbitrary detention, disappearance, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment inflicted by Bosnian-Serb Forces under the command and control of

Litigating Human Rights Claims Against the Estate of FerdinandMarcos, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 65 (1995); Sol
Schreiber & Laura D. Weissbach, In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation: A Personal
Account of the Role of the Special Master, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 475 (1998).
33. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 774 (9th Cir. 1996).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. ROBERT H. KLONOFF & EDWARD K.M. BILICH, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY
LITIGATION 46-47 (2000).

39. Perl, supra note 20, at 781.
40. Id. at 782-83. See Hilao, 103 F.3d at 774.
41. 176 F.R.D. 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). For more on the Karadzic litigation, see Alan Frederick Enslen,
Filartiga's Offspring: The Second Circuit Significantly Expands the Scope of the Alien Tort Claim Act with its
Decision in Kadic v. Karadzic, 48 ALA. L. REV. 695 (1997); Michele Brandt, Comment, Doe v. Karadzic:
Redressing Non-State Acts of Gender-Specific Abuse under the Alien Tort Statute, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1413
(1995).
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42
defendant [Radovan Karadzic] between April 1992 and the present.

In analyzing the certification requirements, the district court concluded that there
were common questions of law or fact for the proposed class. 43 Similarly, the court
decided that the named plaintiffs' claims were typical of the class because they arose
"out of the same alleged course of conduct." 44 Again, the court's analysis of these
issues appears to be quite lenient. The discussion takes place in two very short
paragraphs. The Supreme Court has recognized that the commonality and typicality
requirements tend to merge. 45 Thus, courts often find commonality or typicality is not
satisfied where there are differing factual circumstances among the various class
members. 46 It seems clear that when discussing the proposed class in Karadzic, there
would be a large range of differing factual circumstances among the thousands of class
members, with differing injuries and circumstances under which those injuries were
47
sustained.
Human rights class actions brought by Holocaust victims also received favorable
treatment from the courts. In 1996, Holocaust survivors brought three class actions
against three Swiss banks seeking the recovery of World War II bank deposits. 48 The
case arose because during World War II, Jews and other victims of the Nazis deposited
money in Swiss banks in an effort to safeguard their assets in a neutral country. 49 At

the conclusion of the war, the banks refused to return the money to the survivors or their
heirs. 50 Plaintiffs sought to recover under an unjust enrichhment theory. 51 Plaintiffs
settled the class actions for $1.25 billion. 52 Initially, the banks offered strong
resistance, filing various motions to dismiss. 53 The judge treated these class actions in
a very sympathetic manner. He issued no rulings on the motions and instead waited
almost a year for the parties to settle the case. 54 The judge
supervised a settlement
55
meeting at a restaurant and convinced the litigants to settle.
Holocaust survivors and their heirs also filed a class action against sixteen
European insurance companies who had allegedly failed to pay out on life insurance

42. 176 F.R.D. at 461.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 462.
45. Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982).
46. See In re American Medical Systems, 75 F.3d 1069, 1081-82 (6th Cir. 1996).
47. See Perl, supranote 20, at 780.
48. Michael J. Bazyler, Litigating the Holocaust, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 601, 604 (1999). For more on the
Holocaust litigation, see JOHN AUTHERS & RICHARD WOLFFE, THE VICTIM'S FORTUNE: INSIDE THE EPIC
BATTLE OVER THE DEBTS OF THE HOLOCAUST (2002); Stuart E. Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice: Looted Assets,
Slave Labor and the Unfinished Business of World War II, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 333 (2004); Michael
J. Bazyler, Holocaust Restitution: Reconciling Moral Imperatives with Legal Initiatives and Diplomacy: The
Legality and Morality of the Holocaust-Era Settlement with the Swiss Banks, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 64

(2001); Burt Neuborne, Holocaust ReparationsLitigation:Lessons for the Slavery ReparationsMovement, 58
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 615 (2003).

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Bazyler, supra note 48, at 607.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 608.
Id.

54. Bazyler, supra note 48, at 608.

55. Id.
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•56
5
policies.
Plaintiffs sought $1 billion dollars from each company. 57
Again, the
58
defendants made motions to dismiss the case.
Significantly, the judge used the same
tactic as the judge who
dealt with the Swiss banks; he sat on the motions and waited for
59
settle.
to
parties
the
Similarly, plaintiffs, who were forced into slave labor by the Nazis during World
6
War II, recently brought actions in United States courts against German businesses. 0

Most complaints sought class certification, but were all settled for approximately $5
61
billion in total before the court reached any decision on the class certification issues.
This settlement was reached despite the fact that "certification of the[] claims as Rule
23 class actions would not have been a foregone conclusion."6 2 Class certification 63
was
doubtful, if strict standards were applied, in light of numerous individualized issues.
Thus, human rights class actions seem to have received lenient or favorable
treatment in the courts. What is happening with respect to race discrimination class
actions?

V. RACE DISCRIMINATION

CLASS ACTIONS

Although Rule 23 was supposed to serve as a vehicle for civil rights actions, racial
minorities have faced, and continue to face, significant obstacles in having cases
certified as class actions. For instance, the courts have required that classes must be
adequately defined. 64 The members of the class must be reasonably ascertainable.
Historically, this requirement presented a problem for Mexican-Americans seeking to
bring class actions. In Tijerina v. Henry,65 a well-known Mexican-American civil
rights advocate, Reis Lopez Tijerina, 66 sought to bring a class action on behalf of all
"'Indo-Hispano, also called Mexican-American and Spanish-American"' persons in the
state of New Mexico. 67 He was seeking to require the school boards to provide
bilingual education. 68 The court held that plaintiffs had "failed to adequately define the
class." 69 Plaintiffs had attempted to characterize the class as "having Spanish
surnames, Mexican, Indian, and Spanish ancestry, and that the class speaks Spanish as a
primary or maternal language." 70 The court found this to be "too vague to be

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 609.
Id. at 610.
Id. at 611.
Bazyler, supra note 48, at 611.

60. Detlev Vagts & Peter Murray, Litigating the Nazi Labor Claims: The Path Not Taken, 43 HARV.
INT'L L. J. 503, 503 (2002).

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 509, 529.
Id. at 519.
Id. at 518-30.
See Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669 (7th Cir. 1981).
48 F.R.D. 274 (D.N.M. 1969).
66. See generally F. ARTURO ROSALES, CHICANO! THE HISTORY OF THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 154 (1996) ("The rise of the Chicano movement had no greater symbol of defying the
Establishment than Reis Lopez Tijerina.").
67. Tijerina v. Henry, 48 F.R.D. 274, 275 (D.N.M. 1969).
68. Id. at 278.
69. Id. at 276.
70. Id. at 275-76.
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meaningful." ' 7 1 The Supreme Court declined to hear the case. 72 Justice Douglas,
however, wrote a dissenting opinion where he pointed out the irony in this situation
where those who discriminate are able to identify Mexican-Americans but not the
courts. 73 The Tijerina court did not take a lenient approach to the class certification
decision. In some areas the Tijerina objection to certification of a Mexican-American
class was routinely raised. 74 Ironically, the courts took this position even though in
Hernandez v. Texas 75 the Supreme Court recognized that Mexican-Americans
constitute a class within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 76
Another example of strict scrutiny of class requirements for minorities is the
77
Supreme Court's decision in General Telephone Company of Southwest v. Falcon.
Falcon, a Mexican-American, who claimed that his employer did not promote him
because of discrimination, sought to bring a class action on behalf of MexicanAmericans who were not promoted and Mexican-American applicants for employment
who were not hired by his employer. 78 He claimed that the employer discriminated
against Mexican-Americans on the basis of national origin. 79 At that time, the Fifth
Circuit allowed victims of race discrimination to maintain an "across the board" attack
on all unequal employment practices of the employer. 8 Relying on this authority, the
district court certified a class including Mexican-American employees and MexicanAmerican applicants for employment who had not been hired. 81 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed the class certification decision. 82 In reviewing the decision, the Supreme
"
Court stated that courts must give "careful attention to the requirements of [Rule 23]. 83
In particular, Rule 23 requires that "'a class representative must be part of the class and
possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members. ' ' 4 In this
regard, plaintiffs claims were not typical of the other claims by Mexican-American
employees or applicants. For instance, plaintiffs complaint failed to provide a
sufficient "basis for concluding that the adjudication of his claim of discrimination in
promotion would require the decision of any common question concerning the failure of
petitioner to hire more Mexican-Americans." ' 85 Thus, the Supreme Court rejected the
71. Id. at 276.
72. Tijerina v. Henry, 398 U.S. 922 (1970).
73. Id. at 923-24.
74. See Richard Delgado & Vicky Palacios, Mexican-Americans as a Legally Cognizable Class under
Rule 23 and the Equal ProtectionClause, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 393, 403 (1975).
75. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
76. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480 (1954). For recent analysis of Hernandez, see Michael A.
Olivas, Commemorating the 50th Anniversary ofHernandez v. Texas, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1 (2005);
Kevin R. Johnson, Hemandez v. Texas: Legacies of Justice and Injustice, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 153
(2005).

77. 457 U.S. 147 (1982). For more on Falcon, see Daniel S. Klein, Bridging the Falcon Gap: Do Claims
of Subjective Decisionmaking in Employment Discrimination Class Actions Satisfy the Rule 23(A)
Commonality and Typicality Requirements?, 25 REV. LITIG. 131 (2006).

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 147 (1982).
Id.
See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th Cir. 1969).
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 147.
Id.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 156 (quoting East Texas Motor Freight System Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977)).
Id. at 158.
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"across the board" doctrine and made it significantly more difficult for racial minorities
to bring class actions to redress racial discrimination. After Falcon, many "courts have
strictly refused to allow an employee asserting 86
one type of employment discrimination
from representing a class asserting other types."
A recent study confirms that minorities continue to face significant problems in
having cases certified as class actions. The study examined "all reported employment
discrimination class action decisions issued in federal courts between January 1, 1998,
and May 3, 2001, to determine the percentage of such cases that were certified as class
actions." 87 "Of [thirty-nine] reported decisions involving rulings on motions for class
certification in the employment context and allegations of race discrimination, courts
denied certification in [twenty-seven] instances, or 69% of the time." 88 I have
reproduced the research results of this study. (The cases are listed in the Appendix to
this article.) 89 The cases show that the federal courts rigorously analyze the Rule 23
requirements for class certification in race cases. The opinions are often long,
analyzing virtually every factor in Rule 23. Certification is typically denied because of
too many individualized claims and issues. Consider some representative cases.
A. A Sampling of the Race Cases
In Levels v. AKZO Nobel Salt, Inc.,

the proposed class was denied class

certification on the grounds that it failed to satisfy commonality, typicality, and that
individual issues predominated over common questions. Plaintiffs were seven AfricanAmerican employees of defendant AKZO, who alleged AKZO's supervisory employees
created a hostile work environment for African-Americans by subjecting them to race
discrimination.
AKZO owned and operated a salt mine in Cleveland, Ohio. 92 Some
of the hourly employees engaged at the site worked on the surface under one set of
managers, while others worked inside the mines under a different group of
supervisors. 93 Only one of the plaintiffs worked in the mine; the remaining six worked
primarily on the surface. 94 Plaintiffs sought to represent
a class of African-Americans
95
that included any future and seasonal employees.
As for commonality, the court found that plaintiffs did not adequately demonstrate
that there are questions of law or fact common to the class. 96 In this regard, the court
questioned the commonality of the conditions faced by the surface and mine
employees. 9 7 The court noted that "Plaintiffs make different allegations concerning
work conditions at each location. With regard to surface work, Plaintiffs complain

86. RICHARD MARCUS & EDWARD SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION 268 (3d ed. 1998).
87. Steven J Rosenwasser, Employment DiscriminationClass Actions: The Importance of Case Selection,
18 BNA EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION REPORT 15 (2002).

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
See infra pp. 201-04.
178 F.R.D. 171 (N.D. Ohio, 1998).
Id. at 173-74.
Id.at 173.
Id.
Id.
Levels v. AKZO Nobel Salt, Inc., 178 F.R.D. 171, 174 (N.D. Ohio, 1998).
Id. at 176.
Id. at 177.
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about discriminatory harassment by fellow employees. With regard to underground
work, Plaintiffs complain that supervisors participated in racial harassment or
acquiesced in harassment occurring in their presence."' 98 The Court relied on the fact
that "[s]upervisors do not regularly switch between surface and mine work" to support
its conclusion that there is insufficient commonality of experience here. 99 Under these
circumstances, the court found that the commonality requirement was not met because
10 0
plaintiffs' claims "relate to individualized claims of discrimination."
As for typicality, the court found that the plaintiffs claims were not sufficiently
typical. At the outset, the court observed that the plaintiffs claims are not typical of
proposed class members who suffered discrimination in hiring, in as much as the
plaintiffs did not allege race discrimination based on hiring practices. 101 Then the court
analyzed the typicality of claims among employees in light of the surface/mine
employee distinction holding that since "[i]n these positions, they are exposed to
different co-employees, different supervisors, and different working conditions," they
fail to show that their claims are typical of the claims of the class. 102
Finally, since, as to AKZO, the action is solely for monetary damages, the court
considered whether plaintiffs had met 23(b)(3) which requires a showing that common
questions predominate over individual issues. The court found that individual issues
predominated emphasizing "the nature of the conduct complained of: individual
harassment, by the lack of similarity of persons who may have perpetrated the
10 3
harassment and by the lack of similarity of damages involved."
In Boyce v. Honeywell, Inc., 10 4 African-American plaintiffs sought to certify a class
action against their employer Honeywell, Inc. Plaintiffs alleged that Honeywell
engaged in race discrimination against them in all aspects of employment. 105 The court
found that the Rule 23(a) requirements of typicality and commonality were not met in
view of a "vast array of individual circumstances."' 106 For instance, one named plaintiff
alleged that she was blacklisted, which would require "proof of circumstances unique to
her." 107 For some plaintiffs, a particular promotion process was used, while for other
plaintiffs it was not used. 108 In addition, the members of the class "were not subjected
to the same decision making authority." 109 "Different supervisors made decisions using
different procedures."' 110 For all these reasons, the class could not be certified.
In Zachery v. Texaco, 11 the proposed class was denied certification on the grounds
that commonality and typicality were not satisfied. Here, a class of African-American
plaintiffs sought certification alleging a pattern and practice of racial discrimination
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Levels, 178 F.R.D. at 177.
101. Id. at 178.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id. at 179.
191 F.R.D. 669 (M.D. Fla. 2000).
Id. at 670.
Id. at 676.
Id.
Id.
Boyce v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 F.R.D. 669, 676 (M.D. Fla. 2000).

110. Id.

111. 185 F.R.D. 230 (W.D. Tex. 1999).
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which included denying "(1) promotions and opportunities for promotion, (2)
comparable wages and raises, and (3) training opportunities on the basis of race." 112
With respect to commonality, the court emphasized that "the proposed class is
spread across fifteen states in seventeen separate business units, each of which.., had
varying degrees of autonomy over evaluation and promotion decisions." 113 Under these
circumstances, the commonality requirement was not met since "this action would
degenerate into multiple individual determinations for each individual proposed class
representative."' 114 Likewise, the class representatives failed to satisfy the typicality
requirement since "it [was] foreseeable that [defendant] would raise specific evidence
applicable only to each proposed class representative as to why he or she was not
115
promoted or better trained."
Similarly, in Ramirez v. DeCoster,116 this proposed class was denied certification
on the grounds that individual issues predominated over common issues. Commonality
and typicality also were not satisfied. Mexican-American plaintiffs were a class of
current and former employees of an egg processing facility, alleging racial
discrimination which included "(1) subjective decision-making; (2) blatant disparate
treatment regarding job placement, housing placement, the application of job
performance standards, and access11to7 medical services; and (3) the maintenance of a
racially hostile work environment."
As for commonality and typicality, the court discussed these requirements in the
context of the plaintiffs' fraud and contract claims. The court found that since claims
for fraud and breach of contract are "fact specific to each individual" they would require
"individualized determinations." 118 Accordingly, they fail to satisfy the requirements
of commonality and typicality. 119
The court next turned to Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that common issues
predominate over individual issues in order for the court to grant certification. Here, the
court emphasized that plaintiffs "wish[ed] to certify a class that could consist of
potentially 1,000 members who worked for different durations, in different positions, in
different barns or plants, with different supervisors."' 120 Given these facts, the
predominance requirement was not satisfied "[b]ecause each worker's exposure to this
subjective decision-making and hostile environment [would] vary in nature and degree,
[and so] any trial on 'class' issues [would] quickly
erode into a series of individual trials
' 121
focused on issues specific to each worker."
Finally, in Bacon v. Honda ofAmerica Mfg., Inc., 122 the proposed class of AfricanAmerican employees was denied certification on the grounds that it did not satisfy the
requirements of commonality or typicality, and that individual issues predominated over

112. Id. at 235.
113. Id. at 239.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 240.
116. 194 F.R.D. 348 (D. Me. 2000).
117. Id. at 351-352.
118. Id. at 355.

119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id. at 353 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
Ramirez v. DeCoster, 194 F.R.D. 348, 353 (D. Me. 2000).
205 F.R.D. 466 (S.D. Ohio, 2001).
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common questions. Plaintiffs alleged that Honda discriminated against them by
denying them favorable positions, skilled positions, transfers and promotions. 123
As for commonality, the court noted that the proposed class included over 800
African-Americans, from 4 different manufacturing plants and 39 different departments
(which performed diverse functions).124 Furthermore, the claims spanned a period of
over 20 years during which the promotion practices changed. 125 Given these facts, the
court held that the plaintiffs had not established that proof of any one class member's
126
claim of disparate treatment would involve a common issue to the litigation.
Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiffs had
not shown that commonality
27
existed regarding their claims of disparate treatment. 1
Similarly, with respect to typicality, the court focused on "the diversity of Honda's
operations and the use of decentralized decision making."1 28 The claims of the named
plaintiffs were not typical of the class in light of "the large number of factors which
[were] considered in the promotion process, the diversity in the promotion processes
used by the various departments... and the large number of coordinators or managers
29
who [were] making the various decisions which impact[ed] the promotion process."1
The court next considered certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that
common issues predominate over individual ones. 13 The court determined that an
individualized inquiry into the circumstances of each class member would be required
to calculate compensatory and punitive damages. 13 1 Therefore, class certification under
Rule 23(b)(3) would not be appropriate either. 132 The net effect of this failure to certify
race class actions is to subordinate minorities. As shown above, the cases establish that
courts are fairly lenient in their treatment of human rights class actions. Thus, there
seems to be disparate treatment of the race cases. Such disparate treatment is troubling
and raises the possibility that race is a factor in these cases. It may suggest that the
courts do not see race as a serious problem that calls for resolution.
B. Race and Reparations/HumanRights Cases
There is some evidence that the race reparations/human rights cases might receive
similar tough treatment by the courts. African-Americans have recently brought an
action against the United States seeking reparations for the enslavement of AfricanAmericans and subsequent discrimination against them "from the end of the Civil War
to the present." 133 Although it was not a class action, the judicial system's treatment of

123. Id.at 468.
124. Id. at 478.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 478-479.
127. Bacon v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 205 F.R.D. 466,479 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
128. Id. at 481
129. Id.
130. FED R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
131. Bacon, 205 F.R.D. at 487.
132. Id.
133. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). For more on reparations for slavery, see
Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, FormulatingReparations Litigation Through the Eyes of the Movement, 58 N.Y.U. ANN.
SuRv. AM. L. 457 (2003); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the ReparationsDebate
in America, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 279 (2003).
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the case is revealing. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice and
denied leave to amend. 134 The district court concluded that plaintiffs' claims were
saved by sovereign immunity and opined that "[t]he legislature, rather than the
judiciary, is the appropriate forum for plaintiffs grievances."1 35 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed, holding that it was proper to dismiss plaintiffs complaint without leave to
amend because it failed to identify the violation of any right and failed to establish
subject matter jurisdiction or waiver of sovereign immunity. 136 In addition, the court of
appeals found that plaintiff lacked standing because she was proceeding "on a
generalized class-based grievance" and failed to allege "any conduct on the part of any
that violated a "constitutional or statutory right
specific official" or "specific program"
37
and caused her a discrete injury."1
The trial court and the court of appeals did not deal with this complaint in a lenient
fashion. It is very harsh to dismiss the complaint with prejudice without even giving
leave to amend. The court did not sit on the motions and wait for the parties to settle.
The case seems to be treated more harshly than other human rights/reparations cases.
VI. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DIFFERENT TREATMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CLASS ACTIONS AND RACE DISCRIMINATION CLASS ACTIONS

The case law shows that courts are fairly lenient in their treatment of human rights
class actions. On the other hand, courts give strict scrutiny to race discrimination class
actions. What might explain the different treatment? One possible explanation is that
the dominant group does not perceive that race is a serious issue. A court's view of the
merits of the underlying claims may influence the class certification decision. 138 Thus,
if a court fails to see the issue of race as a legitimate problem, it may see no merit to the
underlying claim. It, therefore, would be inclined not to certify a class action for race
discrimination.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that courts fail to see the merit of the race claims.
As one commentator has recently observed:
When it comes to race cases, which are generally the most difficult claim for a
plaintiff to succeed on, courts often seem mired in a belief that the claims are
generally unmeritorious, brought by whining plaintiffs who have been given too
many, not too few, breaks along the way. These biases, as well as others, inevitably
influence courts' treatment of discrimination cases, and help explain why the cases

134. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105 & n.2.
135. Id. at 1105.

136. Id. at 1106.
137. Id. at 1109.
138. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 & n.12 (1978) (stating that "the class
determination generally involves considerations that are 'enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising

the plaintiff's cause of action' and that "[e]valuation of many of the questions entering into determination of
class action questions is intimately involved with the merits of the claims" (emphasis omitted) (citations
omitted)); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.14 at 256 (2004) ("Courts have recognized

that information about the nature of the claims on the merits and the proof that they require is important to
deciding certification.")
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are so difficult to win. 139

Given this, it is hardly surprising that one recent study has concluded that race
' 140
discrimination in employment suits are "almost impossible to win in federal court."
Why do courts view the merits of the race cases with so much skepticism?
Critical theorists have recently argued that it is hard to correct the racism of our
time because we do not perceive such racism. 14 1 We only understand the racism of
more distant times and places. For instance, with respect to African-Americans, we are
often shocked to see the racist way that blacks were depicted in earlier periods of our
history. In the late eighteenth century, blacks were presented as "childlike, lazy,
illiterate, and dependent on the protection and care of a white master." 14 2 In the early
1800's, whites in black face performed in minstrel shows and promulgated the
stereotype of blacks as "inept urban dandies or happy childlike slaves." 143 Black
women were depicted as a "mammy figure - cook, washerwoman, nanny, and allaround domestic servant - responsible for the comfort of the Southern white
household."' 144 After the Civil War, the newly freed slaves were stereotyped as
"primitive and bestial" and "ready to force sex on any white woman they might
encounter."' 14 5 This vicious image helped justify the lynchings of thousands of black
146
men.
Similar images of the Mexican-American also developed over time. Following the
war with Mexico in the 1800's, Mexicans were portrayed as "traditional, sedate, and
lacking in mechanical resourcefulness and ambition."' 147 Mexicans were depicted as
"the 'good' (loyal) Mexican peon or sidekick, and the 'bad' fighter-greaser Mexican
who did not know his place." 148 "The greaser coveted Anglo women and would seduce
149
or rape them if given the opportunity."
Each ethnic or racial group has been negatively stereotyped in various ways. How
is this possible? We now see that these stereotypes are racist. Why did people not see
it before? As Richard Delgado explains, we are only able to see and "condemn the
racism of another place... or time." 150 "But that of our own place and time strikes us, if
at all, as unexceptional, trivial, well within literary license." 151 "Racism is woven into
the warp and woof of the way we see and organize the world." 152 "Racism forms part
of the dominant narrative, the group of received understandings and basic principles
139. Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard To Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555,
556-57 (2001).
140. Wendy Parker, Lessons In Losing: Race Discrimination In Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV.

889, 940 (2006).
141. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, FAILED REVOLUTIONS: SOCIAL REFORM AND THE
LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGGINATION 4-5 (1994).

142. Id. at 5.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 6.
145. Id.
146. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 141, at 6.

147. Id. at 12.
148. Id.

149. Id.
150. Id. at 14.
151. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 141, at 14.

152. Id. at 15.

2007]

Race Discriminationand Human Rights Class Actions

that form the baseline from which we reason."' 15 3 "The only stories about race we are
prepared to condemn, then, are the old ones giving voice to the racism of an earlier age,
ones that society has already begun to reject." 154 Thus, many white persons fail to see
the extent of racism in our country. For example, Richard Delgado has described the
white majority's view on race in America as follows:
Early in our history there was slavery, which was a terrible thing. Blacks were
brought to this country from Africa in chains and made to work in the fields. Some
were viciously mistreated, which was, of course, an unforgivable wrong; others were
treated kindly. Slavery ended with the Civil War, although many blacks remained
poor, uneducated, and outside the cultural mainstream. As the country's racial
sensitivity to blacks' plight increased, the vestiges of slavery were gradually
eliminated by federal statutes and case law. Today, blacks have many civil rights and
are protected from discrimination in such areas as housing, public education,
employment, and voting. The gap between blacks and whites is steadily closing,
although it may take some time for it to close completely.... Most Americans are fairminded individuals who harbor little racial prejudice. The few who do can be
punished when they act on those beliefs. 155
Thus, whites see the world as a place where racism has been overcome. 156 In stark
contrast to that world view is the outsider perspective. It holds that:
[The history of] black subordination in America [is] a history "gory, brutal, filled
with more murder, mutilation, rape and brutality than most of us can imagine or
easily comprehend."
This... history continues into the present, implicating
individuals still alive. It includes infant death rates among blacks nearly double those
of whites, unemployment rates among black males nearly triple those of whites, and a
gap between the races in income, wealth, and life expectancy that is the same as it
was fifteen years ago, if not greater. It includes despair, crime, and drug addiction in
black neighborhoods, and college and university enrollment figures for blacks that are
dropping for the first time in decades. It dares to call our most prized legal doctrines
and protections shams - devices enacted with great fanfare, only to be ignored,
obstructed, or cut back as soen as the celebrations die down.
Minorities, then, view the world as still very much infected with racism. For
instance, minority scholars describe a world where racial minorities experience

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Richard Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionistsand Others: A Pleafor Narrative,87 MICH. L. REV.
2411, 2417 (1989).
156. See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Deconstructing Homo[geneous] Americanus: The White Ethnic
Immigrant Narrativeand Its Exclusionary Effect, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1493, 1523, 1525 (1998). Vargas notes:
The White ethnic immigrant narrative has helped to construct and reinforce a version of racism
under which . . . Whites claim racial innocence ....
[This narrative] reinforces the myth that
racism . . . is not a serious injury or harm that can persist through history; and that racism and
racist attitudes are not entrenched in current economic structures and social norms.
Id.
157. Delgado, supra note 155, at 2417-18.
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numerous "microaggressions."' 158 "Microaggressions" are "subtle, stunning, often
159
automatic, and non-verbal exchanges which are 'put downs' [of minorities]."'
Members of the dominant group, however, seem to view racism as largely a thing of the
past.
The philosophy of Hegel provides support and an explanation for the critical
insight that we cannot see the racism of our time. Hegel's philosophy of history and his
notion of the owl of Minerva is instructive. History is probably the most important
aspect of Hegel's philosophy. 16 For Hegel, history has a goal. 16 1 Indeed, history
reveals "the plan of providence."' 162 Human beings, however, do not fully understand
the reasons for their actions. 163 Because they do not comprehend the goal of spirit, they
do not truly grasp the reason why they do one act and not another. 164 Reason "us[es]
the passions of men to fulfill her own purposes." 165 Human beings are the "instruments
of the world-spirit." 166
As Charles Taylor explains, for Hegel:
[Mian is never clear what he is doing at the time; for the agency is not simply man.
We are all caught up as agents in a drama we do not really understand. Only when
we have played it out do we understand what has been afoot all the time. The owl of
Minerva flies at the coming of the dusk. 167
Hegel's famous notion of the owl of Minerva "refers to the way that philosophy
always comes too late, when the world is already slipping into dusk."' 168 "We achieve
wisdom about something only when it is fading, is passing into history."' 169 The owl of
Minerva represents the notion that we can understand what has happened in history only
when a historical stage is played out.
This phenomenon, the owl of Minerva, should strike a familiar note with most
people. For instance, we often meet people or experience events, but at the time fail to
realize the important role these people or events will ultimately play in our lives. Only
later, when our lives have played out more fully, will we realize the significance of
these persons and events. For example, some person that we meet by chance will help
us land a job at some future date. Later, we realize the significance of our earlier
encounter with that person.
The application of these ideas to the class action situation is fairly straightforward.
The racism and injustice of our time is hard to perceive because the owl of Minerva has

158. See Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression,98 YALE L. J. 1559, 1565 (1989).

159. Id.
160. See Frederick C. Beiser, Hegel's Historicism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HEGEL 270
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not yet flown. The courts disfavor the race class actions because they are unable to see
the merits of the claims. Our historical stage has not yet passed. It is possible that we
may eventually come to see these recent decisions as unjust or racist, just as we now
recognize the old stereotypes as racist. I think that we can more easily see the racism or
injustice of the older case Tijerina because that historical stage has played out more
fully. It now seems obvious that Mexican-Americans should constitute an adequate
definition of a class.
On the other hand, the human rights class actions receive more favorable treatment.
We are able to perceive those injustices because of the distance in time (e.g. Nazi
Germany) and geography (e.g. the Phillipines). The courts see merit to the underlying
claims. The courts are therefore more willing to facilitate or certify those class actions.
We can see the injustices from other times and places - those historical stages have
been played out and we have achieved wisdom in those situations.
VII. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

The resistance to the certification of class actions brought by racial minorities may
simply reflect that we are living in hard times for civil rights. In recent years, we have
witnessed a number of important obstacles in the law of civil rights: the struggle over
170
affirmative action,
the English-only
172
,... 173movement,171 the outlawing of bilingual
education, 172 anti-immigrant legislation,
the limitation of civil rights as a result of
the United States' response to the attacks of September 11 th, 174 and so on.
In the view of some critical theorists, perhaps we should not be surprised by this
state of affairs. Indeed, Derrick Bell has recently argued that "racism is an integral,
permanent, and indestructible component of this society." 175 Consistent with this view,
176
Richard Delgado contends that the American legal system is inherently racist.
Accordingly, some critical theorists argue that racial minorities cannot rely on litigation
to bring about social change or to establish rights. 177 In fact, some critical theorists
170. See TIMOTHY DAVIS, KEVIN R. JOHNSON & GEORGE A. MARTINEZ, A READER ON RACE, CIVIL
RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN LAW: A MULTIRACIAL APPROACH 321-406 (2001).
171. See, e.g., BILL PIATT, ,ONLY ENGLISH? LAW AND LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
(1990); Steven W. Bender, Direct Democracy and Distrust: The Relationship Between Language Law
Rhetoric and the Language Vigilantism Experience, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 145 (1997); Juan F. Perea,
Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77
MINN. L. REV. 269 (1992).

172. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson & George A. Martinez, Forging our Identity: Transformative Resistance
in the Areas of Work, Class, and the Lawa: Discrimination by Proxy: The Case of Proposition 227 and the
Ban on BilingualEducation, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227 (2000).
173. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics,PopularDemocracy,and California's

Proposition 187: The PoliticalRelevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV. 629 (1995).
174. See, e.g., Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After
September 11, 2001: The Targeting ofArabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295 (2002); Raquel
Aldana, The September 11 Immigration Detentions and UnconstitutionalExecutive Legislation, 29 S. ILL.
U.L.J. 5 (2005); Victor C. Romero, Proxiesfor Loyalty in ConstitutionalImmigration Law: Citizenship and

Race After September 11, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 871 (2003); Natsu Taylor Saito, Will Force Trump Legality
After September 11 ? American JurisprudenceConfronts the Rule ofLaw, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2002).
175. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL ix (1992).

176. See Richard Delgado & Daniel A. Farber, Is American Law Inherently Racist?, 15 T. M. COOLEY L.
REV. 361, 364 (1998).
177. See Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration: Challengesfor the Latino Community in the
Twenty-First Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42, 55-56 (1995); George A. Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy, Judicial
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78
believe that resorting to litigation may actually help bring about racial subordination.1
Courts should treat race discrimination class actions in a more lenient way. We
have seen that human rights class actions receive favorable treatment. The race cases
are analogous to the human rights class actions and should be treated in a similar
fashion. Indeed, race discrimination cases are human rights cases. The United States
has signed and ratified the International Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of
Racial Discrimination. 179 The right to be free from race discrimination is therefore a
human right. 180 Given this, courts should be more willing to certify race discrimination
class actions.
In addition, the perspective of minorities or outsiders should influence the
construction and understanding of the legal system-including the procedural
system. 181 If the current procedural system operates to subordinate racial minorities,
then it should be reconstructed to correct that problem. 182 The current interpretation of
Rule 23 clearly operates to subordinate the interests of racial minorities as they attempt
to seek redress for race discrimination. The failure to certify race discrimination class
actions is particularly egregious since class actions were originally supposed to be a
form of litigation that was to advance the interest of minorities. The Rule 23 analysis,
therefore, must be revised in order to prevent the subordination of racial minorities.
The courts have been very hospitable to the use of class actions in certain business
contexts (e.g., securities cases). As the Third Circuit explained in Eisenberg v. Gagnon,

Class actions are a particularly appropriate and desirable means to resolve claims
based on the securities laws, 'since the effectiveness of the securities laws may
depend in large measure on the application of the class action device.' '[T]he
interests of justice require that in a doubtful case... any error, if there is to be one,
should be committed in favor of allowing a class action.' 183
The Supreme Court has facilitated the use of the class action device in the context
of securities litigation by recognizing the "fraud on the market" theory. The adoption of
this doctrine allowed the use of the class action procedure in securities cases because
without the doctrine, individual issues of reliance might predominate and therefore
prevent class wide handling of the reliance issue. 184 In the same way, the courts ought
Discretionand the Mexican-American Litigation Experience: 1930-1980,27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 555 (1994).

178. See Kimberl& Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988).

179. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for
signatureMarch 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 392 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, and ratified by the
United States June 24, 1994).
180. See Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol & Kimberly A. Johns, Global Rights, Local Wrongs, and
Legal Fixes: An International Human Rights Critique of Immigration and Welfare 'Reform,' 71 S. CAL. L.

REV. 547, 572 (1998) (documenting that there is an "international human right to freedom from
discrimination based on race, ethnicity, and national origin").
181. See ROY L. BROOKS, CRITICAL PROCEDURE xxiii (1998).
182. See id. at xxiv.
183. 766 F.2d 770, 785 (3d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
184. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). See also MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING
SECURITIES LAW 203 (3d ed. 1989) (In recognizing the "fraud on the market" theory, "the Court promoted the
use of the class action to redress Section 10(b) violations. If the Court had required positive proof of
individualized reliance from each plaintiff, individual issues may have predominated over the common ones,
thereby precluding the pursuit of class actions in this context.")
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to facilitate the use of the class action device in race cases.
In this regard, procedural requirements have sometimes been relaxed in the Rule 20
joinder context to allow race discrimination claims to go forward. Rule 20(a) provides
that "[a]ll persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief...
arising out of the same transaction.., and if any question of law or fact common to all
these persons will arise in the action."' 185 The leading case interpreting Rule 20 in a
racial context is Mosley v. General Motors Corp.186 In Mosley, Nathaniel Mosley and
nine other persons joined in bringing an action against their employer General Motors
and their union alleging race discrimination in hiring, promotions, and terms of
employment. 187 The key issue was whether the claims arose out of the same
transaction for purposes of Rule 20.188 The district court found that the claims did not
satisfy Rule 20 since "the ten employees did not work together and had been injured in
different ways by different conduct at different plants." 189 The plaintiffs' joint actions
"presented a veriety [sic] of issues having little relationship to one another." 190 The
court of appeals reversed the district court on this point, holding that "Rule 20 would
' 19 1
permit all reasonably related claims for relief.., to be tried in a single proceeding."
The court explained that the claims arose out of the same transaction since each of the
"plaintiffs alleged that he had been injured by the same general policy of
discrimination." 192 The court might have taken a tougher stance and found that the
claims did not arise out of the same transaction because of the differing circumstances
of alleged discrimination. 193 Instead, the Mosley court staked out a "generous attitude
toward permissive joinder" in the racial context. 194 In the same way, the courts should
take a generous and more lenient approach in making decisions on whether they certify
class actions alleging race discrimination.
This is a suggestion to help bring about a more just, rational society. If the
majority group is alerted, for example, to the possibility of injustice or racism in these
class certification decisions, then perhaps they can pursue a more rational course of
action and correct the problem. According to Hegel, the state must achieve
rationality. 195 But the state conforms to reason on the basis of human action that is "not
really conscious of what it is doing." 196 The rational state, then, "does not come about

185. FED R. Civ. P. 20(a).

186. 497 F.2d 1330 (8th Cir. 1974).
187. Id. at 1331.
188. Id. at 1332.
189. TIDMARSH & TRANSGRUD, supra note 8, at 72.
190. Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1332 (8th Cir. 1974).
191. Id. at 1333.
192. Id.
193. See MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 14, at 32:
It appears in Mosley that the claim of each of the ten plaintiffs is based on different events by
which that plaintiff was allegedly discriminated against as to promotion, conditions of
employment, failure to hire, etc. It also seems likely that different G.M. employees were
responsible for the alleged acts of discrimination against each plaintiff. How then, can the right to
relief which each plaintiff asserts be considered to arise out of the "same transaction[?]"
ld.
194. TIDMARSH & TRANSGRUD, supra note 8, at 73.
195. See TAYLOR, supra note 161, at 123.
196. Id.
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of it." 197
by some men seeing the blueprint of reason and building a state on the basis
Therefore, even if somehow we could have learned the proper structure of the rational
state before its proper time, we would have been unable to apply it. 198 The rational
state can only be achieved and understood at the proper time "because it involves a
growth of reason" and such "growth has to have taken place before we can understand
it." 99 Even if one tried to tell people about the rational state ahead of time, "they
less
would have been powerless to effect it, for it could not have been understood much
2 ° One cannot "transcend one's age." 20 1
identified with by their contemporaries.'
This may raise a problem for this class action project. To the extent that one tries
to explain and understand events before the owl of Minerva has flown - that is, explain
events in advance - one may be trying to transcend one's time period. Hegel's
philosophy of history seems to suggest that even if the argument set forth in this paper
is correct, we may be unable to understand and act on these suggestions. We may not
have achieved the "growth in reason" that will allow us to accept these suggestions and
insights into the nature of our society. Nevertheless, we have to try to overcome the
"time-warp aspect of racism." 20 2 We must make an effort to perceive the racism or
injustices of the present day.
VIII. CONCLUSION

During the time of Jim Crow, racial minorities were sealed off and excluded from
participating in white society. In a manner reminiscent of that earlier time, racial
minorities now are often excluded from using the class action device to bring civil
rights claims.
This paper argues that the courts are very tough in how they handle class
certification decisions in race discrimination class actions. On the other hand, the
courts are quite lenient in how they handle class certification decisions in human rights
cases. The paper offers an explanation as to why this is the case. The paper argues that
race discrimination class action cases should be treated in the same lenient fashion as
the human rights cases.

197. Id.
198. See id.
199. Id.
200. TAYLOR, supra note 161, at 123.
201. d. at 124.
202. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 14 1, at 15.
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APPENDIX
Table of race discrimination class action cases
(in employment context) from 01/01/1998-05/03/2001
Name

Cite

Date

Treatment

Adams v.
Henderson

197 F.R.D. 162
(D. Md. 2000)

11/01/2000

Certification denied (numerosity not
met, damages predominate, and
individual issues predominate)

Allen v. Chicago
Transit

163 F. Supp. 2d
953 (N.D. I1l.

04/06/2001

Denial of certification upheld
(neither commonality nor adequacy

Authority

2001)

Allison v. Citgo

151 F.3d 402

Petroleum Corp.

(5th Cir. 1998)

Artis v.
Greenspan

158 F.3d 1301
(D.C. Cir. 1998)

were present)

08/18/1998

Denial of certification upheld
(damages predominate)

10/20/1998

Denial of certification upheld
(plaintiff failed to exhaust
administrative remedies)

Bacon v. Honda
of Am. Mfg.

205 F.R.D. 466
(S.D. Ohio 2001)

03/07/2001

Certification denied (no typicality,
no commonality, no adequacy of
representation, and damages
predominate)

Bostron v. Apfel

182 F.R.D. 188
(D. Md. 1998)

08/24/1998

Certification denied (neither
commonality nor typicality were
present)

Boyce v.
Honeywell, Inc.

191 F.R.D. 669
(M.D. Fla. 2000)

02/17/2000

Certification denied (no
commonality, no typicality, and no
adequacy of representation)

Burrell v. Crown
Cent. Petroleum,
Inc.
Caridad v.
Metro-North

197 F.R.D. 284
(E.D. Tex. 2000)

11/21/2000

Certification denied (damages
predominate)

191 F.3d 283 (2d

07/30/1999

Denial of certification reversed

01/20/2000

Denial of certification upheld (no
numerosity, no commonality, no
typicality, and no adequacy of

Commuter R.R.

Cir. 1999)

Cruz v. Coach
Stores, Inc.

202 F.3d 560 (2d
Cir. 2000)

I representation)
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Culver v. City of
Milwaukee

202 F.3d 272
(7th Cir. 1999)

10/15/1999

Denial of certification reversed;
remanded for further determination

Curtis v.
Citibank, N.A.

226 F.3d 133 (2d
Cir. 2000)

09/19/2000

Denial of certification affirmed
(plaintiffs failed to file motion
timely)

194 F.R.D. 609
(N.D. I11. 2000)

03/28/2000

Certification granted

203 F.R.D. 520
(M.D. Fla. 2000)

12/06/2000

Certification granted

177 F.3d 448
(6th Cir. 1999)

04/23/1999

Denial of certification reversed

Faulk v. Home
Oil Co.

184 F.R.D. 645
(M.D. Ala.
1999)

03/09/1999

Certification denied (damages
predominate)

Gaines v. Boston
Herald

998 F. Supp. 91
(D. Mass. 1998)

03/30/1998

Certification granted

Jefferson v.
Ingersoll Int'l
Inc.

195 F.3d 894
(7th Cir. 1999)

10/25/1999

Certification vacated (district court
needs to determine whether
damages predominate)

Lang v. Kan.
City Power &
Light Co.

199 F.R.D. 640
(W.D. Mo.
2001)

03/01/2001

Certification denied (neither
numerosity nor commonality were
present)

Lemon v. Int'l
Union of
Operating
Engineers

216 F.3d 577
(7th Cir. 2000)

06/09/2000

Certification vacated (district court
abused discretion in certifying
without providing class members
with personal notice and a chance to
opt-out)

Levels v. Akzo
Nobel Salt, Inc.

178 F.R.D. 171
(N.D. Ohio
1998)

01/07/1998

Certification denied (no numerosity,
no commonality, no typicality, and
damages predominate)

Daniels v.
Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago
Drayton v.
Western Auto
Supply Co.
E.E.O.C. v.
Frank's Nursery
& Crafts, Inc.

20071
Lott v.
Westinghouse
Savannah River
Co.
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200 F.R.D. 539
(D. S.C. 2000)

05/25/2000

Certification denied (no
commonality, no typicality, and no
adequacy of representation)

Lowery v.
Circuit City
Stores, Inc.

158 F.3d 742
(4th Cir. 1998)

09/14/1998

De-certification upheld (district
court did not abuse standard of
discretion in determining that a
class action would be unfair and
inefficient)

McClain v.
Lufkin Indus.,
Inc.

187 F.R.D. 267
(E.D. Tex. 1999)

03/31/1999

Certification granted

Miller v.
Hygrade Food
Prods. Corp.

198 F.R.D. 638
(E.D. Pa. 2001)

01/29/2001

Certification denied (individual
issues predominate)

Morgan v.
United Parcel
Service of
America, Inc.

143 F. Supp. 2d
1143 (E.D. Mo.
2000)

06/26/2000

Motion to de-certify class is denied
as moot

Ramirez v.
DeCoster

194 F.R.D. 348
(D. Me. 2000)

03/31/2000

Certification denied (damages
predominate, and individual issues
predominate)

Reyes v. Walt
Disney World
Co.
Robinson v.
Metro-North
Commuter R.R.
Co.

176 F.R.D. 654
(M.D. Fla. 1998)

02/03/1998

Certification denied (neither
commonality nor typicality were
present)

197 F.R.D. 85
(S.D.N.Y. 2000)

09/27/2000

Certification denied (individual
issues predominate, and no
adequacy of representation)

Robinson v.
Sears, Roebuck
& Co.
Robinson v.
Sheriff of Cook
County

111 F. Supp. 2d
1101 (E.D. Ark.
2000)

07/03/2000

Certification granted

167 F.3d 1155
(7th Cir. 1999)

02/08/1999

Denial of certification upheld (no
adequacy of representation)
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188 F.R.D. 433
(W.D. Tex.
1999)

06/12/1999

Certification granted; settlement
approved

Smith v. Texaco,
Inc.

88 F. Supp. 2d.
663 (E.D. Tex.
2000)

03/07/2000

Certification granted

Thomas v.
Albright
Thornton v.
Mercantile
Stores Co.

139 F.3d 227
(D.C. Cir. 1998)

03/27/1998

Certification granted; settlement
approved

13 F.Supp.2d
1282 (M.D. Ala.
1998)

07/31/1998

Certification denied (dismissed
without prejudice)

Walker v.
Mortham

158 F.3d 1177
(11 th Cir. 1998)

10/28/1998

Renewed motion to grant
certification denied; remanded to
trial court

Williams v. Ford
Motor Co.

187 F.3d 533
(6th Cir. 1999)

08/09/1999

Denial of certification upheld (no
specific allegations provided by
plaintiffs)

Young v.
Magnequench
Int'l, Inc.

188 F.R.D. 504
(S.D. Ind. 1999)

08/23/1999

Certification denied (no numerosity,
and no adequacy of representation)

185 F.R.D. 230
(W.D. Tex.
1999)

03/18/1999

Certification denied (no
commonality, no typicality, and no
adequacy of representation)

Zachery v.
Texaco
Exploration and
Prod., Inc.

